The U.S. has officially declared that space is NOT global commons [1], potentially driven by an erroneous interpretation of the concept in the specific context. At the same time, the U.S. defense establishment emphasizes the importance of “command of the commons”, where space is one of those ‘commons’. [2].
The panel will start by discussing some basic questions: Is space a global commons? What are global commons anyway? Are they similar to the traditional commons discussed in the Bloomington School’s literature? The panel will continue with a discussion on the applicability of the lessons learned from cases of local / traditional commons to global commons, notably outer space, the open seas, the atmosphere, and the Antarctic.
The panel will contemplate the proper use, management, distribution, and conservation of space and its resources, as well as the theory and practice of building institutions for governing the space commons, especially in the context of a changing world in which multilateralism – and the current global order itself – are increasingly contested.
[1] Executive Order 13914: Encouraging International Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources, signed by the President on of April 6, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/04/10/2020-07800/encouraging-international-support-for-the-recovery-and-use-of-space-resources.
[2] Posen, Barry. “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony.” Quarterly Journal: International Security, vol. 28. no. 1. (Summer 2003): 5-46, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/command-commons-military-foundation-us-hegemony.
Traditional commons frameworks—whether environmental or global—prove insufficient for understanding outer space governance. While the Bloomington school addresses Earth's biosphere resources, and global commons focus on planetary assets, outer space defies these terrestrial categorizations. As a 'dead domain' requiring technological mediation for human access, space challenges conventional commons theory, particularly in differentiating between near-Earth and deep space resources.
We propose analyzing space commons through cosmolocalism, a framework combining globally shared knowledge with localized production capabilities. [1][2] Instead of focusing on a 'natural' resource managed by a community, it proposes a networked knowledge-intensive process to address local needs. This approach reconceptualizes space governance through two key elements: technology-mediated localities (ground stations, satellites, manufacturing facilities) and digital commons (open-source designs, knowledge repositories, data). Rather than viewing space as a continuous global domain, we envision it as a network of discrete, digitally connected nodes with physical-world interaction capabilities.
This perspective both complements and challenges current space commons debates. By drawing parallels with Internet infrastructure, where local nodes connect through digital commons, we reveal emerging institutional arrangements that mirror commons-based peer production. The cosmolocal framework offers a more nuanced understanding of space governance than traditional environmental or global commons models, particularly as humanity expands its technological presence beyond Earth. Through examining cases of emerging space institutions, the cosmolocal lens can reveal new forms of commons governance that traditional frameworks might overlook.
[1] Kostakis, V., Niaros, V., Dafermos, G., & Bauwens, M. (2015). Design global, manufacture local: Exploring the contours of an emerging productive model. Futures. 73, 126-135.
[2] Schismenos, A., Niaros, V., & Lemos, L. (2020). Cosmolocalism: Understanding the Transitional Dynamics Towards Post-Capitalism. tripleC: Communication, Capitalism & Critique. 18(2), 670–684.
Current developments in humanity's use of outer space (OS) pose challenging questions around its nature as a commons. On the one hand, commonality is the foundational principle of OS activities. Space is famously characterized as “the province of all mankind” by the 115 signatory countries to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) and its four companion treaties [1]. The OST establishes, inter alia, that countries may not claim sovereignty over any part of space ; that its exploration and use shall be for the benefit of all countries; and that the principle of mutual assistance be implemented “...with due regard to the corresponding interests of all other States.” These and other principles are included in international arrangements such as the ISS Code of Conduct, and the work of the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space - establishing a strong regulatory and operational foundation for the OS commons. On the other hand, the current privatization of OS activities brings existential challenges to this vision. In contrast to the robust foundation of commonality, the US, UK, Australia, EU, India and other countries have implemented regulation that is beneficial, even preferential, to private actors who may not be fully committed to an OS commons, but rather to commercial success. Private spaceflight, exploitation of lunar resources, 3D printing of equipment, data storage centers, and other commercial activities are all part of the New Space economy, approaching the $2 trillion mark by 2035 [2]. These New Space developments are exhilarating, yet their overall impact threatens the vision of OS as a commons. A recent study notes that the commons framework “...is seldom used in bilateral arrangements and is mostly absent from recent agreements made by influential players.” [3] Thus, there is an urgent need for an updated vision for the OS commons. This paper analyzes key elements of such a vision: the roles and responsibilities of diverse private and nation-state actors, given the complexity resulting from technological innovation in OS. The analysis extends beyond the US, including initiatives in the UK, the European Union, Australia, and India; and proposes critical steps needed to maintain elements of the vision of OS as a commons, and a “province of all humankind”.
[1] See https://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties.html.
[2] WEF, Space is booming. Here's how to embrace the $1.8 trillion opportunity, Apr. 8, 2024.
[3] Pic, Evoy, and Morin, Outer Space as a Global Commons: An Empirical Study of Space Arrangements, IJC, Sept. 5, 2023.
The U.S., China, Russia and their partners are racing to establish permanent habitats on the Moon. History demonstrates that initial institutional arrangements are long-lasting and determine the future trajectory and success of a colony. How should the initial governance system of the U.S.’ lunar habitat be designed in order to support its long-term success and mutually beneficial and long-lasting relations with its mother country/Earth? We use extensive literature on initial colonial policies and institutions in different colonies and their effects on the long-term economic and political development as well as how and why they pursued independence. The goals of this paper are threefold: (i) present the different models previously employed to settle and govern colonies; (ii) explore the advantages and disadvantages of each model for the long-term economic development of a lunar habitat; and (iii) identify the factors that triggered economic and political clashes between colonies and their mother countries and discuss which are more likely to arise in the case of a lunar habitat as well as possible institutional arrangements to prevent or handle them. Specifically, we argue that a significant degree of self-governance would better support long-term economic development. Therefore, it is crucial that after the initial settlement is accomplished, private companies and individuals are allowed to enter and gradually take over as many activities as possible. Settlers should eventually start forming their own dispute resolution mechanisms and some political body to determine collective action/decisions. If defense is a serious concern, the habitat will probably require assistance from its mother country and clear mechanisms should be established for this purpose, including regarding who bears the cost of defending the habitat. As the population and economy of habitat grows, eventually it should obtain representation in the political affairs of the mother country; in other words, the habitat should be politically incorporated. To avoid the emergence of an independence movement, the rules for such incorporation should be settled in advance.
The term ‘commons’ has become widely used in recent years to convey shared or cooperative ownership or governance of natural resources, including more open access and global natural resources such as outer space. Governance of commons has a financial dimension to it, including the financing of governance institutions and processes, while also possibly entailing a system of taxation, e.g. applied to the income derived from the exploitation of natural resources. This paper first places taxation in the context of space as commons, i.e. in the context of the range and types of regulation of activities in space that currently exist, especially at international level. It assesses the issue of regulation of space in light of Ostrom’s institutional grammar and subsequent literature on regulating commons. In light of this discussion, it then surveys and evaluates several existing proposals for global taxes relating to space or proposals that are closely analogous to taxation of space activities, in particular: Brock & McMaster on global aviation taxes (2018), Savir’s proposal regarding space-related royalties (2021), and Caljuri on the OECD Model Convention relating to double taxation (2023). The paper concludes by considering the implications for taxation of understanding space within the framework of governance of a commons.
In recent years, many significant commercial space actors have shifted to mission architectures featuring systems of hundreds, thousands, or even tens of thousands of satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). Such systems offer the promise of higher bandwidth, ubiquitous global communications, and higher quality more timely Earth Observation. At the same time, these larger constellations make more intensive use of the space environment, with the potential to generate higher levels of various negative externalities to people on Earth and other space users. Orbit use by large constellations is rivalrous, as the presence of a large constellation in a particular altitude range dramatically increases operational complexity and systemic collision risk for other large systems that would seek to operate at that altitude in an uncoordinated manner. For this reason, best practice documents from NASA, leading constellation operators, and industry groups all recommend against the uncoordinated overlap of these systems.
Prior work by the author has proposed technical mechanisms to quantify orbital use for large constellations and efficiently coordinate constellations, as well as mapped these technical capabilities to potential policy objectives and coordination structures. Such coordination is beginning but remains nascent and largely ad hoc. This talk will describe this coordination problem, known as orbit loading, through the lens of viewing LEO orbital volume as a common pool resource system. It will describe efforts to engage with governmental and industry stakeholders to design and seek to operationalize scalable, efficient, and effective coordination structures for LEO orbit loading. Areas of progress and remaining challenges are described.
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