DeCaro, Marci

The dynamics and evolution of self-governance systems are difficult to understand. Human choice plays a fundamental role. However, this relationship—especially collective behavior and institutional design—is poorly articulated in theory and research. Government involves Faustian bargaining—exchanging individual liberty for collective efficacy, security, and public good delivery. This exchange is central to concepts of the “State” and State-reinforced self-governance (SRSG)—how governments enable/constrain societal self-governance for public good provision and commons management. A behavioral theory of institutional design requires understanding of human motivation, reasoning, and decision-making, as well as learning and memory. This understanding must build on individual and group processes to articulate how boundedly rational agents conceptualize social-ecological dilemmas and governance systems. It must also account for dilemma stakeholders’ strategic positions, goals, and beliefs.

We address this challenge by building on prior attempts by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom to account for Bayesian reasoning and Faustian bargaining in constitutional choice. We integrate these perspectives with principles of social cognition and learning, developing both a conceptual framework and agent-based model (ABM) of the individual and collective learning and decision-making processes involved in creation of self-governing systems. The framework outlines core premises of boundedly rational constitutional decision-makers. Constitutional choice is conceptualized as a bargaining process, whereby stakeholders discuss alternative institutional designs in terms of (a) configurations of design features (e.g., collective choice and regulatory arrangements) that (b) bear on actors’ fundamental needs and liberties (e.g., self-determination, procedural justice, security) and (c) strategic goals. The ABM attempts to empirically test these assumptions with data from a lab experiment, investigating evolution of regulatory systems in a commons dilemma. We describe how constitutional agents form and update mental representations (mental models) via communication, and form preferences for particular institutional designs based on current mental models, goals, and needs.

We further employ the Institutional Grammar and communication coding techniques as the basis for institutional analysis and integration with SRSG and the ABM. This research informs behavioral theory underlying governance of commons, State influence, and collective action via constitutional decision-making.