Panel 3.12. Roundtable Discussion: Contemplating Opportunities and Challenges in the Integrative Study of State-Reinforced Self-Governance via the Institutional Grammar
co-Chairs: Daniel DeCaro1, Emmanuel Frimpong Boamah2, Ute Brady3, Christopher Frantz4, Tanya Heikkila5, and Saba Siddiki6
1University of Louisville, 2University at Buffalo, 3Arizona State University, 4Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 5UC Denver, 6Syracuse University
This panel will host a roundtable discussion on the opportunities and challenges posed by the integrative study of state-reinforced self-governance (SRSG) via the Institutional Grammar (IG). The panel chairs and audience will be invited to discuss the following key topics, as well as questions and topics generated by the panel moderator(s) and audience: (1) What are “commons” in state-reinforced and other societal systems, where government(s) affect (e.g., enable, constrain, contribute to) the creation, governance, and/or management of commons (reconceptualizing the State, non-state, and the commons)? (2) What can IG methods tell us about State power, Faustianing bargaining (i.e., constitutional decision-making underlying society’s fundamental social contracts), and the constitution of polycentric self-governing societies (conceptualizing State power and constitutional choice)? (3) How can concepts of power and SRSG be studied, measured, and assessed using the IG (multimethods and metrics in the study of SRSG)? and (4) How do we envision future opportunities and directions for the development of the IG, SRSG Framework, and the study of the commons (future perspectives)?
Panel 3.5. Advancing an Institutional Grammar of the “State” in State-Reinforced Self-Governance
co-Chairs: Daniel DeCaro1, Emmanuel Frimpong Boamah2, Ute Brady3, Christopher Frantz4, Tanya Heikkila5, and Saba Siddiki6
1University of Louisville, 2University at Buffalo, 3Arizona State University, 4Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 5UC Denver, 6Syracuse University
Recent developments in the concept of state-reinforced self-governance (SRSG) are enabling institutional analysts to rethink the role of the State (or states across different jurisdictional scales) in facilitating and constraining self-governing, adaptive, and transformative solutions to complex societal dilemmas. However, the methods needed to analyze formal policy documents, and informal rules-in-use, in order to evaluate SRSG are underdeveloped. This panel will convene case study papers that apply the Institutional Grammar (IG) in novel ways to examine SRSG. We also seek papers that apply novel techniques designed to simultaneously inform the IG and the SRSG conceptualization of the State, State power, self-governance, and the commons.
Monday, June 16, 2025 3:30 PM – 5:00 PM Hasbrouck Hall HASA0124
Conceptualizing Learning and Constitutional Decision-Making in the Evolution of Self-Governing Systems: an Agent-Based Model of Boundedly Rational Constitutional Agents
in-person
Daniel DeCaro1, Christopher Franz2, Emmanuel Frimpong Boamah3, Marci DeCaro1 and Saba Siddiki4
1University of Louisville, United States, 2Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Norway, 3University at Buffalo, United States, 4Syracuse University, United States
The dynamics and evolution of self-governance systems are difficult to understand. Human choice plays a fundamental role. However, this relationship—especially collective behavior and institutional design—is poorly articulated in theory and research. Government involves Faustian bargaining—exchanging individual liberty for collective efficacy, security, and public good delivery. This exchange is central to concepts of the “State” and State-reinforced self-governance (SRSG)—how governments enable/constrain societal self-governance for public good provision and commons management. A behavioral theory of institutional design requires understanding of human motivation, reasoning, and decision-making, as well as learning and memory. This understanding must build on individual and group processes to articulate how boundedly rational agents conceptualize social-ecological dilemmas and governance systems. It must also account for dilemma stakeholders’ strategic positions, goals, and beliefs.
We address this challenge by building on prior attempts by Elinor and Vincent Ostrom to account for Bayesian reasoning and Faustian bargaining in constitutional choice. We integrate these perspectives with principles of social cognition and learning, developing both a conceptual framework and agent-based model (ABM) of the individual and collective learning and decision-making processes involved in creation of self-governing systems. The framework outlines core premises of boundedly rational constitutional decision-makers. Constitutional choice is conceptualized as a bargaining process, whereby stakeholders discuss alternative institutional designs in terms of (a) configurations of design features (e.g., collective choice and regulatory arrangements) that (b) bear on actors’ fundamental needs and liberties (e.g., self-determination, procedural justice, security) and (c) strategic goals. The ABM attempts to empirically test these assumptions with data from a lab experiment, investigating evolution of regulatory systems in a commons dilemma. We describe how constitutional agents form and update mental representations (mental models) via communication, and form preferences for particular institutional designs based on current mental models, goals, and needs.
We further employ the Institutional Grammar and communication coding techniques as the basis for institutional analysis and integration with SRSG and the ABM. This research informs behavioral theory underlying governance of commons, State influence, and collective action via constitutional decision-making.
