Ostrom’s institutional grammar provides an analytical framework for identifying different rule-types used in the governance of commons, in other words, it provides a typology of rules for how commons can be regulated. Outside of Ostrom’s institutional grammar, norm typology is also found in particular in legal theory, most famously in Hohfeld’s oft-cited (though less often applied) study of jural relations (1919), while a more recent example is Frändberg’s study of the foundations of legal order (2018). By identifying the formal characteristics of rules in general and of different rule types, such analysis provides standards for the appraisal of particular substantive rules. In particular, Ostrom’s institutional grammar provides an overall framework for apprehending the range of possible rule types in the regulation of commons, as well as design principles derived from empirical studies allowing optimal approaches to commons governance. Ostrom made some reference to Hohfeld’s work, but did not use it extensively or compare her rule types to Hohfeld’s jural relations, while Ostrom’s work has been little cited in legal scholarship. Within literature inspired by Ostrom’s institutional grammar, some authors have suggested adjusting aspects of Östrom’s typology (such as Siddiki et al 2011), while others have not relied on Ostrom’ rule types, instead adopting a considerably more detailed typology of rules (de Moor et al 2016). This paper considers Ostrom’s institutional grammar in light of legal norm typology to assess to what extent the latter might be a basis for critiquing or supplementing Ostrom’s approach.
