Water Governance had an important place in Elinor Ostrom’s research. This panel, organised by the Working Group in Water Governance at Ostrom Workshop, explores self-governing irrigation systems from a polycentric approach as well as taking other interdisciplinary approaches. This panel focuses on how collaboration is fostered and negotiation amongst various levels of governance - from individual users and communities, to non-governmental agencies and state institutions takes place. The panel includes broadly successful cases of self-governing water management as well as raises criticism where it has not achieved its objectives, paying particular attention to marginalised groups.
The panel explores how a polycentric approach can effectively address the challenges posed by a diverse and dynamic entity like water governance. Specifically in irrigation, resource self governance and participation has to navigate local cultures and traditions, power dynamics, and manage interdependencies amongst stakeholders. Together with other approaches, the panel aims to build a more comprehensive understanding of the relationship between civic participation, environmental change, and irrigation systems. This panel builds on an existing body of literature that emphasizes the need for water governance systems in the context of current dynamic institutional and environmental change.
The evolving institutional change has resulted in shifts in policy priorities, changes in government structures, and the emergence of new actors and stakeholders. The panel recognizes the need to explore how these institutional dynamics influence the effectiveness of water governance and how they can be harnessed to address water-related challenges more efficiently.
This paper models cooperation in self-governing irrigation systems as a repeated game. Asymmetries arise as the headenders have first mover advantage in appropriating water. However, the need for cooperation in provision (maintaining the irrigation system) can incentivise the headenders to leave water for the tailenders.
We first analyze symmetric cooperation where the headenders and tailenders share the water equally and exert equal effort in maintenance. Symmetric cooperation can be sustainable when maintaining the irrigation system is difficult/costly. Costly maintenance reduces the value of the relationship but the dominant effect is the reduced temptation to deviate so that overall incentives to cooperate are improved.
If maintenance is less costly, the headenders do not have incentives for symmetric cooperation. Their incentives can be restored by asymmetric cooperation where the headenders get more than their equal share of the water. However, asymmetric cooperation in the sense that tailenders put more than equal effort in maintenance weakens the headenders’ incentives because it is more tempting to expropriate tailenders’ large maintenance effort.
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