This paper examines power differentials among diverse, overlapping institutions across different scales and levels in collective decision-making forums for Indigenous peoples (IPs) tenure governance in India's forests. Drawing on Carlisle and Gruby's (2019) polycentric governance framework and Morrison et al.'s (2019) polycentric power typology, I analyze how three dimensions of power—design power, pragmatic power, and framing power—influence polycentric institutional arrangements and interactions affecting IPs tenure (in)security in India's forest commons. Through a qualitative case study of India's Indigenous Rajwar or Van Raji peoples in the Kumaon Himalayas, I demonstrate that while India's Forest Rights Act 2006 envisions a polycentric governance structure, its implementation falls short of its aims. This is because dominant state actors maintain their historical influence through three key mechanisms: weakened design of authority and power, networked patronage, and the perpetuation of incapacity frames (both of self and others). These mechanisms effectively undermine—or 'governmentalize'—the role of IPs, democratic institutions, and local state and non-state actors in decision-making processes. Based on these findings, I argue that dominant state institutions advance their reactionary and rent-seeking strategies through micro and macro political dynamics and respective political-economic priorities that are misaligned with and often conflict with IPs tenure security.
