Thiel, Andreas

Land degradation, driven by various human-induced activities such as agricultural practices, presents a major challenge for countries around the globe, including Tunisia. Land degradation reduces soil fertility, severely impacting agricultural productivity and jeopardizing food security (World Bank 2019). While various laws and policies to halt land degradation have been implemented in Tunisia since the 1990s, these efforts remain largely ineffective. To understand the underlying reasons, we build on literature on social-ecological fit. This literature argues that the failure of policies and degradation of ecosystems can be a result of a misfit between institutions and the characteristic of the social-ecological systems in which they operate. Governance arrangement and institutions thus need to fit the characteristics of the particular problem they address in order to be effective (Young 2008, Epstein et al. 2015).
This paper aims to understand the fit between the institutional arrangements of soil governance in Tunisia, and the social-ecological characteristics of soil problems. Specifically, we analyse whether the actors involved, i.e., state actors and farmers, are capable of addressing the soil management challenges posed by the specific social-ecological context. Or, in other words, how well the characteristics of social-ecological problems and capacities of farmers and state actors fit together. To do so, we build on transaction costs literature to characterize problems of soil management (Thiel and Moser 2019), and analyse the administrative capacities of state actors (Wegrich und Lodge 2014), along with the orientations, incentives, and capacities of farmers. The paper draws upon three local case studies, situated in the governorates of Siliana, Kairouan, and Kef. The analysis is based on data gathered through stakeholder interviews at the national, regional, and local levels, as well as stakeholder workshops and policy documents. The findings suggest that the misalignment between the needs dictated by the social-ecological problem characteristics on the one hand, and the interests and incentives of farmers, as well as the administrative capacities of state actors on the other, contributes to explain failures in soil management.

Idealized polycentric governance, dynamics of institutional change and the Context-Operations-Outcomes-Feedbacks (COOFs) framework assume coordination and order of interdependencies and interactions between actors. The framework juxtaposes societal mechanisms that instil corresponding dynamics. Where such internalization of externalities was not achieved, feedback cycles unleashing social-ecological adaptation process would nudge towards coordination and order. The WEFe Nexus describes an polycentric interactions between actors, activities, policies in the water, energy, food and ecology (WEFe) “sectors”. In the Algarve in Portugal additionally urban water demands associated with households and tourism developed dynamically. Throughout the last four decades governance never achieved coordination and order. Instead, conflict avoidance (not “coordination”) was only possible through enlarging the resource base (pumping, construction of dams, recently, desalinisation, interconnection with resources beyond). Still, the Algarve experienced the severe water shortages, furthered by climate change, but also by tourism development and expansion of irrigation. In parallel, water resource management was implemented since the accession to the EU and the introduction of the European Water Framework Directive. Societal mechanisms of accountable top-down public policy making, and self-organization of water users and stakeholders are actionable in Southern Portugal; also, data and awareness of ever increasing demands could trigger adjustments. However, it was apparently impossible to constrain and coordinate the Algarvian WEFe and urban water demands with available supplies. The paper wonders why this was the case and that way inductively reflects on dynamic polycentric governance and the COOF Framework. It reconstructs the mechanisms that the framework posits and wonders why they were ineffective respectively what further mechanisms and contextual development may have led to lacking efficacy of governance. The paper is based on extensive qualitative data and quantitative water use and demand data. Ultimately, the work promises a better understanding of why and when polycentric governance dynamically fails.

What shapes different forms of governance and their performance, and is the concept of hybrid governance (hybrids) a promising pathway for improving the outcomes of governance, e.g. in environmental governance? Understanding these issues will improve our knowledge for crafting better governance towards desirable outcomes. A natural place to start such work is polycentric governance. Thus, this paper aims to advance on unpacking the black box of coordination in polycentric governance. As it unfolded we found that based on our definition of hybrids as overlapping modes of coordination hybrids dominate empirically. Thus, our work maps distinct hybrids, explore their emergence and determining factors as well as analyze their performance. The paper suggests a positive approach to understanding hybrids. As starting point for conceptualizing hybrids s we use the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework which is strongly related to and therefore compatible with polycentric. We illustrate its application through engagement into five contrasting, illustrative cases in which we identified four different types of hybrids as starting points for further theorizing. We end on identifying types of hybrids and contextual factors shaping them. We suggest the identification of hybrids as future research agenda for unpacking the inner workings of polycentric governance. The paper is based on an edited volume developed among proponents of this abstract and a number of scholars in the field of natural resource governance. We suggest that hybrids are stratified across temporal scales and nested across different levels of institutional order, addressing day to day coordination which is nested in institutions in larger scales of societal organization that structure these modes . Beyond the three modes of governance that overlap in hybrids, we find that the distinction of formal, state-backed legitimization of governance as opposed to informal, community-backed legitimization of governance of component modes of coordination provides a further important dimension of hybrids. The emergence and performance of hybrids depends on social-ecological context configurations.

The study aims at examining the effect of contextual developments on agricultural marketing cooperatives over the past 30 years in the Southern Slopes of Mount Kilimanjaro, Tanzania. It explores on what factors have driven changes in the agricultural cooperatives and how these drivers have affected the operation of these cooperatives. Using economic theories of Institutional change, the study looks at the effect of factor prices, interrelated institutional options, mental models and governance technologies on the internal rules of the agricultural cooperatives. To analyze the changes in internal rules in the cooperatives the study uses the seven-rule typology as an analytical tool from the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework by Ostrom. Through a qualitative approach including in-depth interviews with cooperative leaders, managers, officers and other relevant social groups the study highlights key factors such changes in policies, product prices and market access that have shaped cooperative dynamics. Cooperatives have reacted to contextual changes through adaptive measures such as formation of new cooperative umbrella organizations, seeking international markets on their own and introduction of new marketing systems to address financial challenges. The study underscores the importance of adaptive strategies and collaborative governance to strengthen the role of agricultural cooperatives in promoting sustainable development in the region.

Bangladesh is renowned as one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable nations, facing profound challenges in agriculture due to climate change. Both technological and institutional innovations are vital for addressing these challenges. Climate Smart Agriculture (CSA) aims to increase agricultural productivity, adapt to climate change, and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Despite considerable attention to technological innovations, there's limited literature on institutional innovation. One such institutional innovation is the Common Interest Group (CIG). This study focuses on process and outcome features of participatory governance and to present the effects of institutional structures in a bottom-up manner. It has been combined the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework and Network of Adjacent Action Situation (NAAS) as coherent approach for analyzing the institutional structures, endogenous and exogenous factors. By scrutinizing institutional structures and considering both exogenous and endogenous factors, the research provides valuable insights into the dynamics of CSA diffusion. Through a comparative analysis of four CIGs with similar mandates, the study uncovers nuances in institutional arrangements and the different degree in the working rules among the four cases. Besides institutions, climate uncertainty and community attributes play an important role for choice and diffusion of CSA technologies. The examination of governance qualities across the cases highlights varying levels of legitimacy, effectiveness, transparency, accountability, and equity. Findings revealed that the legitimacy and effectiveness were medium and high for all cases, while transparency, accountability and equity were low for two cases. However, the study underscores the importance of tailoring CSA interventions to local contexts while addressing institutional deficiencies to ensure their successful implementation and diffusion. This study suggests disseminating context-based CSA technologies by overcoming institutional shortcomings.