Wang, Yahua

The common pool resource (CPR) theory has inspired the recognition of community self-governance in natural resource management. However, many CPR literature treated government as an external variable to community, without sufficiently considering the close interaction between the two, especially in strong-government context. In this paper, we applied two case villages on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau of China with different governance systems for caterpillar fungus (Ophiocordyceps sinensis), a CPR with lucrative values, to study the effects of the different interventions of the local government with multiple tasks from higher authorities. In both villages, we find that the local governments have demonstrated a resolute commitment to completing their tasks, with a particular focus on the core tasks, which has significantly influenced the institutional design in caterpillar fungus governance. However, in the institutional enforcement, local governments wield considerable discretion, which results in diverse paths and levels of effectiveness of caterpillar fungus governance. Rather than a forceful government that supplants community self-governance, a facilitative government that assists in monitoring and sanction can foster more robust community self-governance of caterpillar fungus. Our findings underscore the pivotal role that local governments play in CPR governance, which defines the characteristics of CPR governance in strong-government context. Furthermore, these findings enrich the applications of CPR governance theory, particularly in the aspect that how government-community interacts to develop a self-governance institution in strong-government context.

Collective action has been a central theme in the discourse on commons governance, reflecting the inherent challenges of managing shared resources. However, there is the lack of coherence in addressing how multiple factors operate in unison within a single scenario, and whether there are interplays between different elements that could influence the governance of commons. China has the world's largest irrigation system, which is one of the typical commons. In the past decade, the China Institute for Rural Studies (CIRS) at Tsinghua University has organized large-scale rural investigations every year to collect data on agricultural and rural development including water conservancy and irrigation management, to form a large rural survey database on irrigation system (CISD). Based on the CISD, more than 30 pieces of works has been produced in the past decade, including a dozen of international publications, which provides an opportunity to analyze multiple factors and complicated relationships in a unified scenario of the commons. This study aims to address the aforementioned gaps by synthesizing studies based on CISD that examine collective action within the Chinese context, utilizing a unified database and consistent measures. We firstly provide an in-depth examination of the collective action challenges and solutions within China's irrigation commons. We then integrate these findings within the commons theory framework. Based on the Chinese context, we tested the applicability in the Chinese context of the variables that achieve consensus, responded to controversial variables, and discovered some new influencing factors. In addition, our research focuses on the causal mechanisms affecting collective action. Through causal path analysis, we identified the complex mechanisms that weaken and promote collective action. The implications of this research are twofold: it reveals the institutional diversity and dynamic adaptability in the management of collective action, and it demonstrates the potential application of delicacy governance.