The role of collective action among farmers to curtail environmental problems has been under studied. The conventional wisdom to dealing with negative externalities, such as water quality degradation, greenhouse gas emissions, or biodiversity loss, is to use regulations, especially negative financial incentives, to discourage problematic practices. In agriculture, particularly in countries where production is heavily subsidized, regulations are usually limited in scope due to their political unpopularity with farmers. Recent farmer protests across multiple European countries in response to EU climate policies for agriculture illustrate the challenges of implementing regulations. Voluntary adoption of pro-environmental management practices has been the standard approach but has not generated substantial environmental improvements. In this panel, we will explore the role that collective action among farmers, as well as their interactions with relevant stakeholders, such as agricultural extension agents and government officials, has and could play in changing the status quo on environmental degradation in agroecosystems. We will look at how collective action around negative externalities may be different from canonical approaches in the commons literature and explore different dimensions of how collective action could complement or be incorporated into existing agricultural policy.
Theoretical explanations for why local resource users cooperate to sustain common-pool resources also point to its limitations in situations where there are pollution problems. In agroecosystems, farmers can sometimes cooperate to reduce negative externalities arising from modern farming practices, such as water quality degradation, but theory to predict when and how cooperation can be effective remains lacking. Two key factors are missing in negative externality situations: interdependency of consequences (i.e., the need to internalize costs) and livelihood benefits gained from reducing the negative externality. In canonical CPR cases, interdependencies supply the need for rulemaking while livelihood benefits provide the motivation to cooperate; in pollution problems, third-party enforcement is typically required. A similarity between these types of situations may be the role of social norms (as common and/or acceptable behavior) in shaping the level of self-compliance that occurs. While CPR research has focused largely on explaining the presence of how rules are made and enforced, the underlying support for developing the rules has not been central to theoretical explanations. Analyzing farmer social norms can provide a valuable window into explaining why farmers support or oppose changes practices or policies that cause negative externalities because norms can reflect prevailing beliefs about what farming practices or policies are acceptable or problematic, and whether acting on those beliefs are obligatory or suppressed due to social pressure. This paper looks at how social norms have been theorized in research on how farmers respond to water quality degradation challenges and its implications for the role of cooperation in negative externality situations.
Despite extensive promotion of conservation practices in agriculture, the adoption of such measures remains low. Among these practices, cover crops are widely recognized as an effective method for reducing soil erosion, minimizing nutrient loss, and enhancing soil health. However, adoption rates of cover crops by farmers remain limited. Farmers are a heterogeneous group, varying in their motivations and constraints. Understanding these differences is crucial to addressing broader societal goals related to pro-environmental behaviors. To inform the development of more effective conservation outreach and incentive programs, this study aims to develop a typology of farmers in Indiana, a key agricultural state in the U.S. Midwest. Using survey data and multivariate analysis, we will explore latent and unobservable constructs related to conservation behavior. Through this approach, we expect to identify distinct types of farmers based on key characteristics that influence their engagement with soil conservation practices. By identifying and understanding the differences between these farmer types, we aim to provide insights for crafting more targeted and tailored conservation messages and incentives.
