The common pool resource (CPR) theory has inspired the recognition of community self-governance in natural resource management. However, many CPR literature treated government as an external variable to community, without sufficiently considering the close interaction between the two, especially in strong-government context. In this paper, we applied two case villages on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau of China with different governance systems for caterpillar fungus (Ophiocordyceps sinensis), a CPR with lucrative values, to study the effects of the different interventions of the local government with multiple tasks from higher authorities. In both villages, we find that the local governments have demonstrated a resolute commitment to completing their tasks, with a particular focus on the core tasks, which has significantly influenced the institutional design in caterpillar fungus governance. However, in the institutional enforcement, local governments wield considerable discretion, which results in diverse paths and levels of effectiveness of caterpillar fungus governance. Rather than a forceful government that supplants community self-governance, a facilitative government that assists in monitoring and sanction can foster more robust community self-governance of caterpillar fungus. Our findings underscore the pivotal role that local governments play in CPR governance, which defines the characteristics of CPR governance in strong-government context. Furthermore, these findings enrich the applications of CPR governance theory, particularly in the aspect that how government-community interacts to develop a self-governance institution in strong-government context.
