Session 9. 2. C.

Making a livelihood in the Sundarbans mangroves in the Gulf of Bengal has become increasingly challenging due to extreme poverty, frequent cyclones, tiger attacks, smuggling and organized crime by pirates, as well as historical marginalization rooted in colonial exploitation and exclusionary forest governance. In recent years, Bengal Tiger protection and climate-focused development interventions have emerged as a dominant strategy for mangrove governance, which many argue requires a careful re-assessment of their effectiveness and impacts. Grounded in qualitative methodology, with a conceptual focus on political ecology, this exploratory case study draws on six months of community-level fieldwork and aims to critically analyze the de facto challenges to resource access, rural social-political dynamics and everyday livelihood concerns and vulnerability of mangrove communities in the region.

This study finds that moneylending has become an instrumental strategy for managing increased government fees and revenues, as well as extra-legal expenses associated with harvesting trips. Moreover, moneylending not only shapes livelihood choices and options but also crucial for dwellers to survive seasonal hardship through non-harvesting periods and adapt to emergencies. For marginalized mangrove resource dwellers who depend on harvesting cycles, existing formal moneylending services offer ill-fitting timelines and inaccessible barriers such as high collateral deposits and legal documentation requirements. As an alternative, moneylenders have become important actors controlling rural cash supply and informal power in mangrove resource governance. The study outlines a debt trap related to the resulting high dependency on informal cash access, elite capture and local price control for forest resources, paired with systematic injustices and accountability gaps. In its conclusion, the paper raises the question of how effectively addressing local dwellers’ moneylending concerns may act as an indirect, or secondary tool in mitigating the growing overall livelihood vulnerability burden and conservation challenges in the region.

Key Words: brokers and middlemen, forest bureaucracy, maladaptation, micro-credit, co-optation, development

Multiple-use common-pool resources (CPRs) are used for activities such as irrigation, fishing, and recreation (Steins and Edwards, 1998; Meinzen-Dick and van Der Koek, 2001; Ramachandran, 2006). While collective rules and institutions are key for managing CPRs (Ostrom, 1990; Schlager and Blomquist, 1998; Agrawal, 2003), more research is needed on specific strategies employed by resource user groups with power asymmetries to access, use, and manage resources from multi-use commons. Limited research finds that less powerful users respond to domination through strategies such as silence, non-participation, or solidarity (Agrawal, 2002; Cleaver, 2002; Kashwan, 2016; Mudliar and Koontz, 2021). These strategies, termed “everyday politics” (Kerkvliet, 1999), are shaped by power dynamics, social relations, the perceived meaning and value of the resource, observations of behaviors, and life experiences (Edwards and Steins, 1998). This research, therefore, explores how groups with power imbalances (i.e., farmers and Dhinwars, an Indigenous fishing community) manage and access multi-use commons such as the Maji-Malguzari (MM) tanks in eastern Vidarbha, Maharashtra, India, for their livelihoods. MM tanks, dating to the 16th century, are used by both groups, with farmers seeking to appropriate water for paddy irrigation and Dhinwars seeking to maintain water levels for their fish stock. By employing Kerkvliet’s concept of everyday politics, focus-group discussions, and interviews reveal that while Dhinwars may endure unfair conditions, they also employ various resistance strategies against farmer domination. By examining everyday politics between different resource user groups, this study aims to deepen understanding of the interplay between domination and resistance in natural resource management.

The assertion that "the fisheries sector contributes significantly to global food sustainability" is well founded given the growing importance of fish as a key protein source for billions of people worldwide. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 2020) highlights that “fish is not only the most traded and consumed goods globally but also a critical component in addressing food security challenges (FAO, 2020; Loring et al., 2019).” This is particularly significant for coastal and island communities, where fish is a primary dietary staple and a vital economic resource. Moreover, global fisheries and aquaculture production reached a new high of 214 million tonnes in 2020, a 65% growth from 2004 (FAO, 2022), This supports the importance of the fishery sector to global development. This means that prudent measures must be put in place to achieve sustainability. The purpose of this study is to investigate the nature of power relations in the co-management of fisheries in Ghana: Experiences of fisher in Komenda Edina Eguafo Aberim (KEEA) Municipality. The main focus is to provide insights into how power dynamics influence the effectiveness of co-management structures and the collaborations between fishers and policy-makers. The study employed a qualitative research approach and a single case design. In-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and participant observation were used to collect the data from fishers, community leaders, and fisheries officials. The study found that the delegated co-management structure designed to empower fishers and promote sustainable fisheries practices is entangled in a web of political influence. Indeed, co-management in the fishery sector is a network riddled with power imbalances. The study concludes by recommending that policymakers critically reassess the delegated co-management policy. This reassessment should employ a framework that focuses on uncovering and addressing power imbalances and structural inequalities to enhance effective co-management practices.

In rural Cambodia, inland freshwater and rice field fisheries are key sources of income, animal protein, and important ecosystem services. As the flood pulse in the Tonlé Sap floodplain recedes post-monsoon, leaving rice fields and local water bodies dry, Community Fish Refuges (CFRs) offer a promising path to sustain dry season fish stocks, aquatic biodiversity, and secure water for agriculture and husbandry. Their sustained physical integrity and productivity as multiple-use system depend on the ability of communities to collectively manage these systems. To explore whether the communities studied have been able to respond to the challenge of collectively managing CFR, we assessed two CFR sites established in 2016 by local and international organizations alongside government agencies. Our aim is to examine: 1) the presence, extent and effectiveness of collective action (CA) at the community level to manage CFR; and 2) the factors that either facilitate or inhibit CA in relation to CFR. We conducted a qualitative case study in two sites in Kampong Thom province between March and May 2023. These were chosen because, although they have similar ecological characteristics, they have different management outcomes according to the implementing international organization, WorldFish. This paper examines a process led by external actors seeking to reshape local behavior and existing institutional arrangements. The study reveals that centralized power structures, rural patronage politics, and limited peer-to-peer communication hinder villagers' participation and agency in managing Community Fish Refuges (CFRs) in Cambodia. These local power dynamics are tied to broader national politics, restricting villagers' ability to drive change and suggesting a need to reevaluate the CFR committee's structure to enhance legitimacy. While extended funding and well-informed external interventions are essential, the study questions the short-term feasibility of CA, emphasizing the critical role of contextual factors and policymakers' assumptions. The findings suggest that CFR governance challenges stem from complex external and internal constraints rather than inherently community limitations.

Patron-client relations have long played a significant role in influencing the management of fisheries and shaping fisherfolk livelihoods. Despite a vast literature on patron-client relations in fisheries, little literature explicitly examines how these relations influence fisheries co-management. This paper responds to this gap by reporting on research into how patron-client relations interact with fisheries co-management, with consequences for how fisheries co-management operates and performs. Taking Bangladesh as a case study, two examples of co-management supported by different donor-funded projects were investigated using a framework to analyse the nature and implications of patron-client relations on co-management. The research drew on the concepts of hidden and invisible power by Gaventa (2006) and the defining characteristics of patron-client relations and co-management to identify three key analytical themes: power relations; obligation and trust; and, cultural norms. The study found that the powerful non-fisherfolk senior males in the Panchayat (village-organization), the patrons in the studied areas, manipulated co-management structures and processes, used patron-client relations in the form of male community leaders (Panchayat)-fisherfolk links and developed informal rules to control access of the fisherfolk to fisheries and credit, to maintain their power and status. Patrons used existing systems of social status that set fishers at the bottom of social ranking and women largely away from public spaces, preventing the co-management systems from being inclusive and empowering. The research confirmed that patron-client relations within a fishing community can significantly shape externally-introduced co-management by influencing who is involved in fisheries co-management and how it functions.