Session 12. 9. B.

Market is a complex and rigorous environmental governance instrument, and building a nested institutional system is a necessary condition for the market mechanism to play its advantages in the governance of the rural commons. Institutions can not only limit the profit-seeking nature of the market mechanism and reduce the transaction cost of the market, but also help expand the market and achieve the unity of fairness and efficiency. Focusing on whether and how the market mechanism can improve the governance of rural living environment, this paper makes an empirical analysis with 133 villages and 976 farmers in southwest of China as samples. Research shows that it is difficult for a single market mechanism to improve the governance of rural living environment. When the government-led institutional rules intervene, the advantages of market mechanism can be brought into play under the protection and constraint of high-level institutional rules. On this basis, this paper discusses the relationship between the government and the market in the governance of the rural commons by using the nested institutional system analysis framework, and summarizes the institutional design of "market under institution". The institutions have a crowding-out effect on the market mechanism, that is, although the government-led institutional rules will weaken the promotion of private interests by the market mechanism, these reduced private interests will also be transformed into public interests under the influence of institutional rules, thus promoting the improvement of social benefits and finally achieving the compatibility of fairness and efficiency. Furthermore, this paper analyzes the internal mechanism of transforming private interests into public interests by using the institutional design of "market under institution". In this process, without losing the role of the government, the market is not losing its efficiency, the combination of promising government and effective market is realized, and the balance between public interests and private interests is achieved in the governance of the rural commons.
Keywords: Market mechanism; Government; Institutions; Collective Action; Rural Living Environmental Governance

This article identifies multiple roles that "bridging organizations" play to promote the co-production of public services: an institutional system embedder that implements multi-dimensional empowerment, a socially skilled agent that carries out institutional production, and a social network actor that stimulates individual motivation. It examines the mechanisms of how bridging organizations promote co-production: hierarchical nested capability mechanism, the capital conversion mechanism, and the socio-psychological mechanism. This paper argues that, at macro level, social organizations need to be integrated into the system of institutional relations and jointly promote the multi-level capability enhancement of multiple stakeholders in public services. At meso level, social organizations are in a unique ecological niche in the entire social network and contribute to the reproduction of the institution through the circulation of resources, knowledge, and information. At micro level, the co-production of public services emphasizes the role of informal systems to activate social norms and create new values.

Collective action has been a central theme in the discourse on commons governance, reflecting the inherent challenges of managing shared resources. However, there is the lack of coherence in addressing how multiple factors operate in unison within a single scenario, and whether there are interplays between different elements that could influence the governance of commons. China has the world's largest irrigation system, which is one of the typical commons. In the past decade, the China Institute for Rural Studies (CIRS) at Tsinghua University has organized large-scale rural investigations every year to collect data on agricultural and rural development including water conservancy and irrigation management, to form a large rural survey database on irrigation system (CISD). Based on the CISD, more than 30 pieces of works has been produced in the past decade, including a dozen of international publications, which provides an opportunity to analyze multiple factors and complicated relationships in a unified scenario of the commons. This study aims to address the aforementioned gaps by synthesizing studies based on CISD that examine collective action within the Chinese context, utilizing a unified database and consistent measures. We firstly provide an in-depth examination of the collective action challenges and solutions within China's irrigation commons. We then integrate these findings within the commons theory framework. Based on the Chinese context, we tested the applicability in the Chinese context of the variables that achieve consensus, responded to controversial variables, and discovered some new influencing factors. In addition, our research focuses on the causal mechanisms affecting collective action. Through causal path analysis, we identified the complex mechanisms that weaken and promote collective action. The implications of this research are twofold: it reveals the institutional diversity and dynamic adaptability in the management of collective action, and it demonstrates the potential application of delicacy governance.

Community engagement has emerged as a significant trend in China, spanning multiple scales from community projects to district guidelines and national policies. While existing studies have examined both top-down interventions and bottom-up initiatives, the complex interplay between these approaches at the community scale remains understudied. Through a case study of a Community Party-mass Service Centre renovation in Wuhan, China, this paper investigates these intermediary processes to understand the dynamics of community commons governance in an Eastern context. The government initiated this renovation project to enhance community governance and explore policy implementation methodologies in a relocated community.

Through in-depth ethnographic research focusing on the Centre as a confluence of contested interactions between hierarchical and grassroots agencies, this paper demonstrates how the community governance system is contextualised and appropriated to facilitate the process of commoning. By examining the transformative transition during the renovation of the space, the paper reveals dynamic tensions between top-down and bottom-up agencies in defining and redefining the space.

The findings contribute to a more nuanced understanding of governmentality and local participation in urban China. By unpacking the complex dynamics of community governance, we reveal how community commons is cultivated through collaborative processes that bridge state authority and community needs.

This paper challenges simplistic notions of top-down governance versus bottom-up participation, suggesting instead a model of community commons where agencies meet, interweave, and manoeuvre through the process of commoning. It offers valuable lessons for urban planners and policymakers seeking to foster resilient, participatory, and hopeful urban communities by balancing governmentality with meaningful local participation.

Keywords:
Community governance, Urban commons, Community participation, State-society relations, Chinese urbanisation