Over the last few decades, the diversity of governance solutions proposed by scientists and policymakers for addressing mounting environmental problems has increased substantially. The traditional trichotomy of state, market and community governance has been replaced by a new interest in hybrid regimes in recognition that no single governance mode possesses the capabilities to address all current environmental problems. This paper takes stock of experiences that combine community and market-based governance solutions, or as we call them community-based environmental markets (CBEMs), to address environmental issues in a variety of resource management contexts. We first propose a classification system based on the authority held by communities and the type of good being transacted to identify four general classes of CBEMs. These include communal resource markets, communal service markets, collective resource markets and collective service markets. We then illustrate the utility of this classification system with a review of studies from the water, forest, pastures, fishery, agriculture and wildlife conservation sectors. We conclude with some hypotheses regarding the relative effectiveness of different types of CBEMs with respect to a range of social and environmental objectives.
With 184 signatory nations and regulating and monitoring the trade of endangered species across the globe, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) demonstrates a global/ transnational collective action. Governance in this case involves managing common-pool resources characterised by intricate ecosystems and a vast array of species that are interconnected with broader political, economic and social systems. As such CITES is shaped by the highly complex, multifunctional, multi-level governance environment and the different actors -who often table diverse perspectives, different priorities, resources, and capacities.
The diversity of actors and interests complicates governance, as different groups may have conflicting priorities. Despite the inherent conflict between trade (economic development) and conservation typical under CITES, various actors at different scales must cooperate to achieve collective outcomes. The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, to provide a thorough analysis of CITES as a governance system, identifying both its strengths and weaknesses; and second, to evaluate how interactive governance principles could be integrated into CITES. By applying interactive governance theory, we will assess CITES’ ability to engage diverse actors, manage conflicts, and operate across different governance levels. This could provide a pathway towards more resilient and responsive environmental agreements in the future.
Climate-change aridification of Colorado River Basin in the U.S., where flows have dropped dramatically, affects the population’s thinking about water distribution and related legal and political arrangements. Century-old agreements encouraged people using the river to imagine it in segments, with little practical connection or communication between “upper” and lower” regions of the basin. Yet the multistate “Colorado River Compact” of 1922, which assumed stable average flows, now appears outdated and even threatening. Major infrastructure built to implement the compact cannot deliver expected water to the lower basin, and sanctions prompted by low flows could force shutdown of industrial and municipal uses in the upper basin. We describe how all involved are coming to see the river as a common resource which they must figure out how to share in the new era of unpredictable water flows – resulting in intense talks involving seven U.S. states and the national governments of both the U.S. and Mexico. We show that those talks echo back into local communities. Our analysis identifies fear of unilateral change as a driver of locally-designed institutional change. Even in the most rural of the basin states, Wyoming, the threat of strict enforcement of the old compact is inviting innovation. Disparate water users have begun to consider water trading and sharing that were anathema only a few years ago. Isolated ranchers, the local mining industry, small cities and conservationists at first gathered loosely to hear about basin challenges from state water managers. In 2024 they created a governance structure which encourages them to learn from each other as well as from hydrologic and economic modelling. These water users are now poised to advise state water managers what legal mechanisms will support more flexible and fluctuating water use locally and respond to the needs of the river as a whole.
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